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This paper explores the relationship between identity and security through an 
investigation into Jewish diasporic identity. The paper argues that the convention of 
treating identity as an objective referent of security is problematic, as the Jewish 
diaspora experience demonstrates. The paper presents a new way of conceptualizing 
identity and security by introducing the concept of diasporic security. Diasporic 
security reflects the geographical experience of being a member of a trans-state 
community, of having a fluid identity that is shaped by sometimes contradictory 
discourses emanating from a community that resides both at home and abroad. In 
introducing the concept of diasporic security, the paper makes use of literature in 
Diaspora Studies, Security Studies, recent works in contemporary political theory and 
sociology, and Woody Allen’s film Deconstructing Harry. 
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Introduction 
 
Identity is important for any theory of security and there are various treatments 
of identity in security research. In Security Studies, the recognition of identity’s 
importance came late, and was largely a post-Cold War “discovery.” Debates about 
identity in Security Studies have tended to presume that identity, whether of groups or 
individuals, is spatially located in the state. However, the premise of this paper is that 
the state is not necessarily the primary political space that connects identity to 
security, even while it is within the geographical location of states where security and 
insecurity come to be experienced. What if there is another political space, a diasporic 
space, which is important for our understanding of how identity can be tied to 
security. This paper explores this question by focusing on the Jewish Diaspora, and of 
the various ways that Diasporic identity creates a non-statist framing for the 
relationship between identity and security.  
Through Jewish Studies, this paper offers a contribution to thinking in 
Security Studies. Diasporic identity is doubly problematic for Security Studies. First, 
diasporic security poses a different type of security threat. Diasporic security it is not 
quite the same as the status of migrants although the dividing line between a migrant 
community and a diaspora community can be unclear. It is also not the same kind of 
threat that we find in the category of societal threats.
1
 In both regards, a difference has 
to do with the spatial dynamic of a diaspora and with the historical tendency of 
sovereign states to be suspicious of diaspora communities. Second, diaspora 
communities exist across states and, consequently, involve different communities that 
are joined in one sense to a shared identity narrative, but also live in different 
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sociological and historical contexts. Diasporic security thus refers to a trans-state 
space, but it also speaks to how individuals and communities find themselves faced 
with security challenges that exist across the traditional lines of spatial analysis. The 
concept of diasporic security is more than identifying a different level of political life. 
Diasporic security exists in multiple planes or levels at the same time, and thus it 
emphasizes a relational character among the various orders of political and social 
aggregation. 
Central to the argument that follows is how the referent of diasporic security is 
always fluid and blurs any divisions between different levels of socio-political life. 
What may seem like a national threat or even a foreign policy issue can become a 
security experience pertaining to an individual’s sense of self. The debate regarding 
“who is a Jew” is one such example that will be examined. Diasporic security 
involves suggesting a framework that problematizes a levels of analysis approach. 
The levels of analysis problem, whether in IR or sociology and while sometimes 
methodologically useful, ignores the extent to which levels are never neat categories, 
and in diasporic security, the importance of identity construction exists in (at least) 
two planes simultaneously: individual and collective. However, before proceeding it 
may prove helpful to briefly explore (1) the concept of diaspora and (2) how identity 
has been treated (or not) in Security Studies.  
 
The Concept of Diaspora: an introduction 
 
The concept of diaspora may as well be an essentially contested one,
2
 for 
providing a single definition of what constitutes a diaspora is quite difficult. Indeed 
Robin Cohen identifies at least four different phases of how diaspora has been 
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understood.
3
 The first is the historical phase, concerned primarily, but not exclusively, 
with the Jewish diaspora. The second phase (from the 1980s onwards) used the term 
metaphorically. The third phase came about a decade later and was influenced by 
postmodern or post-structural thought and especially the conceptual possibilities 
opened up by theoretical study of deterritorialization. The fourth phase seemingly 
involves a merger of the previous phases, taking on board the insights from 
broadening the concept but came to emphasize the role of the home and homeland and 
uses ideal-type theory. 
 In the character of the fourth phase, Cohen identifies nine “common features 
of diaspora”: 
1. Dispersal from homeland, often traumatically, to two or more foreign 
regions; 
2. Alternatively or additionally, the expansion from a homeland in search 
of work, in pursuit of trade or to further colonial ambitions; 
3. A collective memory and myth about the homeland, including its 
location, history, suffering and achievements; 
4. An idealization of the real or imagined ancestral home and a collective 
commitment to its maintenance, restoration, safety and prosperity, even 
to its creation; 
5. The frequent development of a return movement to the homeland that 
gains collective approbation even if many in the group are satisfied with 
only a vicarious relationship or intermittent visits to the homeland; 
6. A strong ethnic group consciousness sustained over a long time and 
based on a sense of distinctiveness, a common history, the transmission 
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of a common cultural and religious heritage and the belief in a common 
fate; 
7. A troubled relationship with host societies; suggesting a lack of 
acceptance of the possibility that another calamity might befall the 
group; 
8. A sense of empathy and co-responsibility with co-ethnic members in 
other countries of settlement even where home has become more 
vestigial; and 
9. The possibility of a distinctive creative, enriching life in host countries 
with a tolerance for pluralism.
4
 
A shorter definition is provided by Gabriel Sheffer: “Modern diasporas,” he writes, 
“are ethnic minority groups of migrant origins residing and acting in host countries by 
maintaining strong sentimental and material links with their countries of origins – 
their homelands.”5  Belonging to a diaspora community means that one is, in the 
words of Sheffer, “at home abroad.”6 However, diaspora communities are not 
necessarily the same as what others have termed “transnational communities.”7 Part of 
the difference is in what joins a diaspora community as opposed to a transnational 
community. The primary difference is in what makes a diaspora a community, which 
according to Gabriel Sheffer, is its ethno-national character.
8
 A transnational 
community could, potentially, be any kind of trans-state community, economic or 
political. However, one of the defining features of a diaspora community is in how the 
collective identity of a diaspora and the individual identity of its members are 
mutually constitutive. In the Jewish case, this nearly symbiotic relationship between 
individual identity and of being part of a diaspora is demonstrated in claims to Jewish 
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Peoplehood.
9
 It is in this vein, that Sheffer is able to make reference to the ethno-
national basis for diaspora. 
A problem with these definitions, which is a problem for diaspora theory in 
general, is how far back one needs to trace the migrant origins, what is meant by 
origin, and what is meant by ethnicity. The problem of definition can make any 
account of diaspora politics difficult. Cohen’s approach suggests ideal-type thinking 
but, importantly, this does not mean that he views diaspora as a static concept. Indeed, 
and crucially, he recognizes that diasporas are always in a state of flux, that diasporic 
identity is not fixed.
10
 
 Not all accounts of diaspora politics, however, take on board the extent to 
which identity is fluid. Of particular relevance here due to its focus on international 
relations and security is the work of Yossi Shain.
11
 Shain correctly points out that, 
“Given their international location, diasporas are aptly suited to manipulate 
international images and thus to focus attention on the issue of identity.”12 Moreover, 
“Diasporas are among the most prominent actors that link international and domestic 
spheres of politics.”13 Importantly, Shain recognizes the socially constructed character 
of identity and identity politics. Nevertheless, he treats identity objectively. This 
treatment of identity is consistent with the main methodological approaches to 
identity-based research in Security Studies. Thus, for Shain, national identity is, “both 
a variable and a resource” that diasporas engage with.14 While “diasporic 
distinctiveness tends to be fluid and more tenuous” diasporas nevertheless engage in 
national identity politics according to their interests as an ideational group to “ensure 
and sustain an identity that perpetuates and nourishes their self-image.”15 This 
treatment of identity as a variable requires identity to function as an objective 
explanatory heuristic. Moreover, according to Shain and Barth, political practices 
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(defined in terms of interests and power) may vary. The identity of the group, 
however, does not. The fluidity here is one of group strategy and not of identity-
construction or identity-maintenance.   
Indeed, diasporas often suggest that identity is objective and static, but this is a 
mistaken assumption encouraged by the political tradition of the modern-state, with 
its emphasis on a uniform, singular national identity.
16
  Shain adopts this problematic 
narrative. He writes, “Concerns over diasporic identities and actions are mostly 
associated with the ‘threat’ of multiculturalism and/or dual loyalty.”17 The 
presumption that these are threats functions only to the extent that a false story about 
national homogeneity is accepted
18
 and that identity can be treated as an objective 
referent. Treating identity objectively enables identity to function as a variable, which 
means that it can only have one meaning at any given time. Diasporas, however, are 
both a product of, and a challenge to this way of thinking. Diaspora communities 
develop their narratives of identity and belonging by being members of at least two 
political and geographical communities at once: the state where they reside and their 
people or kin abroad. Diasporas are thus always both inside and outside the state in 
which they reside and hold multiple narratives of belonging and peoplehood 
simultaneously. 
  
Identity in the Security Studies Literature 
 
 Traditionally, security in International Relations (IR) and Security Studies was 
understood to refer to the problem of war and inter-state violent conflict. When 
identity was thought about in regard to security, the most logical place to look was in 
terms of national identity.
19
 Consequently, the literature on identity was primarily 
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concerned with the security dynamics of the identity narratives of national interest. 
One of the more interesting developments in systematic thinking about identity and 
security was to shift away from this focus. This development is due to the shift in 
research topics in the post-Cold War era, and to the contributions made by 
constructivist, feminist and post-structuralist IR scholars,
20
 as well as broader changes 
in the social sciences. As Bill McSweeney pointed out in a 1996 article, “Identity has 
been a fashionable preoccupation of social scientists for many decades….”21  
In 1996 three important works were published on identity and security, 
McSweeney’s article being one of them. Another was The Culture of National 
Security,
22
 and a third was Yosef Lapid’s and Friedrich Kratochwil’s interestingly 
titled edited collection, The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory. Contrary to 
the title, Lapid’s and Kratochwil’s book suggests that not only is identity a concern in 
IR theory, but that it always was an area of importance: “questions of culture and 
identity have been always part and parcel of our analysis of the social world.”23 
Indeed, two years later in a 1998 article Michael Williams argues that the theme of 
identity has always been present in some form. “‘Identity’ concerns,” he writes, “have 
never been missing from theorizing about International Relations and security.”24  
Indeed, in 1975 Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan co-edited a book 
exploring the importance of identity in politics. As they write in the introduction,  
We are suggesting that a new word reflects a new reality and a new usage 
reflects a change in that reality. The new word is ‘ethnicity,’ and the new 
usage is the steady expansion of the term ‘ethnic group’ from minority and 
marginal subgroups at the edges of society… to major elements of a society.25  
In this collection Donald Horowitz foreshadows later emphasis in security studies on 
the importance of identity and boundary maintenance. As Horowitz writes, “Political 
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boundaries tend to set the dimensions of the field within which group contact occurs. 
That contact, in turn, renders it necessary for groups to sort out affinities and 
disparities.”26 Another example clearly demonstrating the importance of identity and 
of diaspora in international relations is the 1986 edited volume, Diasporas In 
International Politics.
27
  
Ethnicity and/or identity did not become a core feature of the Security Studies 
research agenda until the post-Cold War era with the growth of identity awareness 
partly being due to the work of the Copenhagen School.
28
 This literature, however, 
treats identity as an objective referent, sometimes a variable, of security. 
Note for example this recent explanation from the Copenhagen School’s key 
thinkers. According Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, “The organizing concept in the 
societal sector is identity.”29 By identity the authors mean community, and a society is 
a “community with which one identifies.”30 The main security issues in the societal 
sector involve migration and what the authors refer to as horizontal and vertical 
competition (horizontal competition is between identity groups, with the threat 
coming from either inside the state or in a neighbouring state, and vertical competition 
is when there is a power relation that seeks to impose a national-identity on the 
community).
31
 Another possible threat is depopulation. Identity in this example is 
treated as an object. This way of treating identity is common in the Security Studies 
literature, and is consistently found in most of Buzan’s work, including an earlier text 
of which he was a co-author, Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in 
Europe.
32
 
In a critique of Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe, 
Bill McSweeney argues that the account of identity presented in this book is overly 
fixed:  
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In their view, identity is a property of society, not to be confused with human 
beings. It ‘emerges’ (a frequently used term) from the peculiar interactions of 
people and institutions in each society, fixed and incorrigible like the 
computer output of a complex arithmetic.
33
  
According to McSweeny, Buzan and Wæver do not provide a robust theory of 
identity. Contrary to how Buzan and Wæver use the term, “Collective identity is not 
‘out there’, waiting to be discovered.”34 Indeed,  
Who we are is not a matter of fact imposed on individuals who ‘belong’ to the 
society of Wæver et al. Their idea of collective identity as a social fact 
projects the image of a collective self to be discovered: we are who we are. 
The evidence and philosophical argument point more convincingly to process 
and negotiation: we are who we want to be, subject to the constraints of 
history.”35 
Identity, as leading political theorists and sociologists have demonstrated, is not static 
and cannot be treated as objective but is rooted in difference and is fluid and/or 
contingent. Diasporic identity is no different. 
 
Identity/Difference and the Geography of Diasporic Security 
 
 As the leading political theorist William Connolly argues, identity is crucially 
tied to difference: “To confess a particular identity is also to belong to difference.”36  
Any sense of self is contingent on having some idea of the other, of being able to 
recognize difference. However, the construction of the modern self is based on a 
paradox: it involves the certainty that enables the self to exist as an independent and 
certain reality, but this certainty does not exist, or at least, not very clearly.  
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There are different ways to explain this paradoxical condition. For example, 
Anthony Giddens writes about ontological security. “To be ontologically secure is to 
possess,” he writes, “on the level of the unconscious and practical consciousness, 
‘answers’ to fundamental existential questions which all human life in some way 
addresses.”37 Ontological security is about having confidence in one’s own identity. 
Giddens recognizes that self-identity recognition can fluctuate, and in late modernity 
(to use his terminology) such changes are the effects of chance and risk, as opposed to 
fate and destiny.
38
 The inherent uncertainty of chance and risk can pose challenges to 
one’s ontological security. Put differently, the uncertainty of life in an age devoid of 
enchantment (to use Weber’s terminology) makes any sense of a stable and 
unchanging self impossible. Self-security is necessarily contingent on the ability to 
navigate through modernity’s risks and chances. The modern self in pursuit of a sense 
of authenticity can find it in a self-reflexive mode of making political choices about 
where to take one’s life, and ontological security comes from the creation of routine. 
 William Connolly provides a different approach to the same paradox.
39
 He 
writes, “Without a set of standards of identity and responsibility there is no possibility 
of ethical discrimination, but the application of any such set of historical constructions 
also does violence to those to whom it is applied.”40 Connolly asks, “What if the 
human is not predesigned to coalesce smoothly with any single, coherent set of 
identities, if life without the drive to identity is an impossibility, while the claim to a 
natural or true identity is always an exaggeration?”41 At stake in this question are the 
foundations of Western thought, traced in particular back to St. Augustine, that 
presumes, and perhaps even requires, that the answer to this question be that people 
are necessarily tied to a single coherent identity. The paradox, however, is that this 
answer implies that difference and/or otherness is bad, that it poses a threat, even 
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though any identity construction necessarily requires difference. Moreover, the 
stronger the identity, the greater the danger so that “a powerful identity will strive to 
constitute a range of differences as intrinsically evil, irrational, abnormal, mad, sick, 
primitive, monstrous, dangerous, or anarchical – as other.”42  
The politics of self/other dynamics have been addressed in a variety of ways, 
but the focus here is about developing a theory of diasporic security, of how identity 
and security relate to each other in global politics. Giddens approaches this question 
by beginning with existential and psychological questions of human life in societies, 
and then makes the claim that the decisions people make in their life choices can have 
global implications.
43
 Alternatively, Connolly suggests a focus on what he calls the 
slipperiness of identity: 
My identity is what I am and how I am recognized rather than what I choose, 
want, or consent to... Identity is established in relation to a series of 
differences that have become socially recognized. … Identity requires 
difference in order to be, and it converts difference into otherness in order to 
secure its own self-certainty… Identity is thus a slippery, insecure experience, 
dependent on its ability to define difference and vulnerable to the tendency of 
entities it would so define to counter, resist, overturn, or subvert definitions 
applied to them.
44
 
There is always an uncertainty about identity – an absence of clear definable borders 
about where the self starts and the other begins.  
This uncertainty is reflected in the geographical location of diasporic identity, 
of its simultaneous inside and outside character that contextualizes a diaspora 
according to multiple differences.  The diaspora is not just a group with a sense of self 
constructed both individually and communally, it also exists as a location of multiple 
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differences: there are differences within the diaspora community, differences between 
the diaspora and the hostland, and differences between the diaspora and, if there is 
one, the homeland. Diasporas are others not just as a minority group in relation to the 
majority, but in some ways also among themselves and their kin in the homeland. 
These differences inform the spatial geography that helps define diasporic security.  
Spatially, diasporic security is significantly different from traditional 
theoretical assumptions about security in that the geography of a diaspora makes it 
either vulnerable or threatening for a related reason: that a diaspora is always 
potentially at home in more than one place. Thus, for the nation-state, a diaspora 
could pose a threat because of ties that it has to its kin abroad, and possibly to a 
homeland. A diaspora community, however, is vulnerable in a similar way. An attack 
against one diaspora community is understood as an attack against the entire diaspora, 
regardless of where one lives or what passport one holds. 
One of the core characteristics of diasporic identity is the sense of belonging 
to a community that resides in multiple states. There are a few traits that define 
diaspora, some of which are more important than others for understanding diasporic 
security. One of these important traits is that of belonging to a trans-state community. 
This kind of community is different from that found and identified in the 
communitarian literature, which is about a state-based identity. Diasporic identity 
cannot be explained purely by reference to the state. Anthony Smith’s work on 
peoplehood
45
 could suggest one avenue of enquiry were it not for his focus on state-
based peoples. Nevertheless, his emphasis on the importance of constructing the idea 
of a people and of the acceptance of this narrative construction is important. Indeed, it 
is this narrative of belonging to a people that is so important for diaspora communities 
as it helps address the multiple differences that complicate the idea of diaspora 
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people. In the Jewish case, this narrative is especially important as it makes it possible 
to overcome the differences that frame particular Jewish communities and think in 
terms of Jewish peoplehood.  
The relevance of the ideas of peoplehood, geography, belonging and security – 
and all in a Jewish context – are visible in a scene from Woody Allen’s movie,  
Deconstructing Harry. In this movie there is a conversation between the character 
played by Woody Allen, Harry Block, and his sister, Doris: 
Doris: I'm a Jew. I was born a Jew. What… do you hate me because of that? 
Harry: And if our parents converted...  to Catholicism a month before you 
were born, we'd be Catholics and that would be the end of it. They’re clubs. 
They’re exclusionary. All of them. You know, they foster the concept of 
‘the other’… you know, so you know clearly who you should hate. 
Doris: Would you… That’s enough! 
Harry: Let me ask you a question: if a Jew gets massacred, does it bother 
you more than if a Gentile gets hurt or a Black or a Bosnian?  
Doris: Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes it does. It does. I can’t help it. It’s my people.  
Harry: They’re all your people. 
Doris: You know what? Burt is right about you. You’re a self-hating Jew. 
Harry: Hey; I may hate myself, but not because I’m Jewish.46 
This fictional encounter can be read not as fiction, but as an example that compresses 
many of the everyday political, sociological and even philosophical issues confronting 
Jewish debates about identity and security. There is something very telling about this 
exchange. It is true that for many people the communities that they belong to carry 
greater weight for their sense of values, duties, obligations and emotional 
commitment than does the general category of human being. As the philosopher 
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Michael Walzer has argued in a critique of John Rawls, it does not matter what 
anybody would chose to do, but “what would individuals like us choose.”47 Allen is 
raising an important issue, and this is that a person’s sense of identity creates a series 
of personal commitments and attachments that outweigh others. Moreover, such 
attachments enable the ability to discriminate against other individuals as outsiders. 
 For Doris, Harry’s religious sister, she “can’t help” caring more for other Jews 
who suffer, even if she does not know them personally. This is a view that needs to be 
taken seriously. In his recent book, The Crisis of Zionism, Peter Beinart writes, after 
suggesting possible ways for American Jews to challenge Israeli policy of supporting 
Settlements, “As I write this, I cringe. When I see a Jews – any Jew – I feel a bond. 
No matter his politics, he and I share a people, a people whose members have often 
had little to rely on but one another.”48 The fictional Harry, however, correctly points 
out the logical absurdity that there is no good reason to feel (more) connected to 
strangers just because one was born into that particular community. For Harry there 
needs to be something more that would establish such a connection and in the absence 
of this connection we should in theory all care equally for any other human being who 
is hurt simply because we are all human beings. He points out that Doris is able to 
know who she is largely by being able to distinguish the differences that her “people” 
have from others. Harry argues that the differences crucial to her sense of identity are 
exclusionary in a destructive sense. Harry, who takes pills, drinks a lot, treats his 
friends and family badly, and is addicted to sleeping with prostitutes, appears to be 
making the case for a moral universalism. Perhaps this is part of the joke. In any case, 
the exchange is important because what comes out of it is both the intractable nature 
of the argument (no agreement is possible) and that there are, in fact, good reasons to 
accept parts of either argument. 
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 While Harry may have abstract logic on his side, and he is right to emphasize 
how practices of difference enable questionable practices of exclusion and inclusion, 
Doris has an empirical reference point to individual psychology and emotion. She 
claims to have a greater connection to her people, to fellow Jews, than to the abstract 
and general category of human beings, and there is no good reason to disregard her 
argument.
49
 What is important here is that she is not making the argument in 
philosophical terms. Rather she says, “I can’t help it. It’s my people.” It is a shared 
peoplehood that draws her commitment, and this is not something that the 
philosophically minded Harry can easily refute. Indeed, he does not try to.  
At issue here is not that Harry is wrong and Doris is right, or vice versa. The 
exchange between Harry and Doris centres not just on the question about what the 
foundations may be for one’s commitments to strangers, but also on the security 
connotations therein. For Harry, religions are exclusionary groups that enable 
discriminations that are, for all intents and purposes, random. They are not the product 
of rational thought but merely the accident of membership. Note how his argument is 
based on being born into a community, not joining one voluntarily. This is an 
important caveat because if you voluntarily join a club the element of choice and 
consent comes into play. However, if you are born into a community you effectively 
do not have such a choice, although you may have the choice of leaving and joining a 
different community.
50
 But this is not Harry’s concern. His concern is with how 
exclusive membership enables discriminations that have both moral and security 
implications. He also, interestingly, seems to suggest that there is something 
fundamental about belonging to a community, for if membership is not important 
there is no problem here.  
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Harry raises two security issues. First, the self/other dynamic that he identifies 
is of particular significance in security discourses since it is generally politically 
easier to make the case to support people “like us” and to deploy resources 
accordingly. Harry is also correct to point out that the ability to distinguish others is 
an important first step for violent exclusionary practices, although he is wrong to 
presume that this is an inevitable outcome.  
The second security related point is with caring more for “your own people” 
than for strangers. This obviously follows from the first point, and it is the claim put 
forward by Doris. It is necessary for a self/other framework to exist in order to then 
adopt Doris’ position, but what her position also suggests is that ties to peoplehood 
are important in a way that other political ties cannot address. The language of 
political philosophy is often framed by the opposing poles of either communitarian 
state-centrism or various global cosmopolitan universalisms. What is easily missed is 
the idea that there are other communities that claim our commitments. If we look at 
Harry’s examples, he reflects this dichotomy of either responding to a massacre or to 
a single individual human suffering harm. It is security, or rather the experience of 
insecurity, that drives his question, and it is the security of her people that is of greater 
importance to Doris. Doris would, presumably, be more concerned about an attack 
against a Jew in France than a stabbing of someone who is not Jewish in Manchester. 
She would probably read with great concern a recent article in the US-based Jewish 
periodical, The Forward about how the European Jewish Congress is “demanding a 
more proactive response to the recent escalation in anti-Semitic attacks around 
Europe, which its leader called ‘smaller tremors before a massive earthquake.’”51 The 
article refers to “shots fired at a yeshiva in Manchester, England, swastikas and death 
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threats sprayed on a Jewish Agency building in Russia, a rabbi in France assaulted 
while riding the subway and Jewish cemeteries desecrated in Germany.”52 
 The article is evidence of the kind of security threat that a diaspora community 
faces, a threat that exists across state lines but which targets the same community. 
This situation raises some interesting questions. What is the referent of security in this 
diasporic discourse of identity and security? What kind of security is at issue in such 
discourse? What is the spatial terrain in which the security threats are perceived to 
exist? Are they local, trans-national, global, statist, diasporic?  
 
Diasporic Security 
 
 If diaspora may as well be treated as an essentially contested concept, the 
concept of security is not much clearer.
53
 Almost everything today becomes a security 
concern. In addition to the usual physical threats that frame state security concerns, 
security is now also concerned with health, economics, technology, food, and of 
course, identity. What underlies most definitions of security is a reference to a threat, 
with greater specificity coming from the referent of security. “Security as a concept 
clearly requires a referent object, for without an answer to the question, ‘The security 
of what?’ the idea makes no sense.”54 Objects of security, however, are also always 
subjects of security. Security, as Buzan notes, requires a referent, but as R.B.J. Walker 
argues, the so-called object of security is more like a contingent subject of security:  
[To rethink the meaning of security] demands that the process of rethinking 
security must respond especially to questions about whose security is being 
assumed and under what conditions…. Consequently, also, interrogations of 
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security must contend with practices that are apparently abstract, practices 
whose concrete powers derive precisely from their apparent abstraction.
55
 
To presume an objective referent is to misrepresent the political basis that serves as a 
referent for security. Moreover, once taken into the realm of identity politics, security 
referents need to refer to abstractions that have multiple meanings and implications. 
For example, it is conceivable that the same identity group will have different security 
needs at the same time in regard to different contexts, that this multiplicity of security 
discourses reflects the multiple political identities held by members within this same 
group, and that their security needs may come into conflict with each other.  This 
multiplicity is crucial in recognizing the unique feature of diasporic security. In 
diasporic security the referent can also be the subject, the domestic the international, 
the local the global.  
 Diasporas exist as a recognizable identity-group in part out of self/other 
encounters between identity groups that are divided up geographically by modern 
nation-states. The diaspora exists as a minority because its identity is constructed in 
reaction to a majority. The national identity of the majority forms the other for the 
minority, while minorities serve as the other for national identity. Yet even within a 
diaspora group there will be differences that this national-identity type of thinking 
struggles with. For example, if we turn to the archetypal diaspora, the Jewish 
diaspora,  the Jews’ political history has come with the lesson that regardless of what 
differences may exist inside the community, they will always be treated as a 
homogenous group that could pose a threat because of their difference. Jean-Paul 
Sartre’s work on anti-Semitism demonstrates the extent to which this is the case.56 
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 However as Connolly argues, Sartre does not turn this analysis inward. The 
presumption in Sartre’s otherwise brilliant critique is that it does not give way to how 
the identities of both Jews and anti-Semites fluctuate:  
Sartre loads narrative weight on the absolute freedom of the self when 
discussing the anti-Semite and then shifts it to the situation in which 
freedom is enacted when discussing the Jews. The anti-Semite has freely 
chosen his self, and the Jew has been enclosed in a situation in which any 
choice of self is self-defeating.
57
  
The point here is not that anti-Semitism and other forms of racism do not function in 
this manner, but that Sartre’s logic does not provide the necessary opening to escape 
this self-defeating condition. The power seemingly rests not with the Jews but with 
the anti-Semites (once they change their minds). Sartre unintentionally demonstrates 
the great scope by which identity is treated in oddly static terms. Even when diversity 
and fluidity are underlying features of identity-politics, the tendency is toward an 
understanding of identity that views it as an object.  
 The example of diaspora could be read to reaffirm this kind of theoretical 
assumption. Diasporas seemingly function in terms of nation-state politics. They have 
a homeland, a hostland, and their identity-politics are defined by the challenges of 
belonging to both a nation and a state that are not in the same place. In modernity they 
are products of a Westphalian logic that allows them to operate only to the extent that 
they reaffirm both their national identity and their citizenship, even when nation and 
state are in geographically separate places.  
 However, the concept of the diaspora does not need to be read like this. 
Indeed, Cohen recognizes different ways of understanding diaspora in his typology, 
even though he favours retaining a state-centred account. An important example in the 
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diaspora literature that is not state-centred is with the idea of the Black Atlantic, a 
diaspora comprised of the shared historical experiences and repercussions of the slave 
trade.
58
 The Boyarins’ critique of diaspora provides a Jewish example. As they argue, 
the idea of diaspora challenges the geographical and national logic of the modern state 
by being “an alternative ‘ground’ to that of the territorial state.”59 This ground 
challenges the violent and static identity discourses of the modern state and 
emphasizes instead a kind of unavoidable acceptance of contingency. 
 Even if one insists on treating identity as an object, the concept of diaspora 
can suggest how the subsequent logical presumption that identity-politics would 
follow either a single voice or a single interest, representative of belonging to a 
singular community, is false.  Even if an identity-group presumes to act as one voice, 
there never is one voice. Diaspora groups have different interests just like everybody 
else, but their interests involve the added complication that their identity is understood 
not just in terms of the immediate geographical community in which they reside, but 
also of communities of people who share the same historical narratives as a minority 
group but who live in different countries. Jews in America are different from Jews in 
the UK, but they both have important relationships with Israel because they are 
Jewish, not because they are citizens of either the United States or the United 
Kingdom. Jews in America also have more than one voice. There is a significant 
diversity of Jewish approaches to religion as well as to Israel.
60
 To take one non-
religious example, being Jewish does not mean that one has to be a Zionist. Moreover, 
even if one is a Zionist it does not mean unquestioning support for Israeli policy. The 
paradox is that the diversity of Jewish thought regarding Israel is either marginalized 
(both within and outside of Jewish communities) or simply presumed not to exist. 
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Debate certainly exists, but it is framed as a dissenting voice, when it is recognized at 
all.
61
 
 Why this is relevant for understanding identity and security is because 
recognizing how identity and security matter is to recognize how neither security nor 
identity can be objectified. Security is always tied to identity, and as identity is not a 
stable referent, but changes and is based on multiple encounters with difference, so 
too does security. Identity-based referents of security are necessarily plural and 
contingent, based on difference and otherness. There is no objective referent here, 
only multiple and contested subjects. The referents are not static, but constantly 
shifting, and thus if there is a referent it needs to be a referent of subjects, of 
movement, of difference(s). Security is, in other words, a fluid discourse that changes 
as identity claims do. 
  Most likely by accident, Cohen’s typology helps to clarify how the identity 
and security dynamics overlap in ways that emphasize this fluidity. The Jewish 
diaspora can provide one illustration. The American and Canadian Jewish diasporas in 
particular are faced with multiple security challenges, the first being the assimilation 
and intermarriage rates. According to Cohen, the exogamous marriage rate in the 
United States is around 52%.
62
 Clearly, this situation poses an existential security 
threat to the Jewish people, and in fact this threat of assimilation was a constant 
refrain in Arthur Herzberg’s important book, Being Jewish in America.63 However, 
J.J. Goldberg points out that whether this situation is threatening or not depends on 
how one defines Jewish identity. It may, he points out, threaten the traditional idea of 
being Jewish as involving regular synagogue attendance, but not in other ways of 
demonstrating Jewish identity.
64
 If, however, we accept Herzberg’s argument the 
threat is not just an existential one, but could also potentially lead to a reduced ability 
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to defend Jewish communities from anti-Semitism. The risks posed by dwindling 
Jewish numbers also play into the ideological narrative of Zionism. According to this 
narrative, the homeland of the Jews is in Israel, and only in Israel will Jews be safe 
from persecution and assimilation, and be able to protect the future of the Jewish 
people. Consequently, in order to prevent significant and potentially disastrous 
reduction of Jews, it is crucial, at least, to support the Jewish State of Israel. Ideally, 
the Zionist argument would support Jewish immigration into Israel. Alternatively, if 
we start with Goldberg instead of Herzberg, what becomes clear is how Jewish 
identity changes and so, consequently, will our understanding of what constitutes a 
threat to the Jewish people. 
 One issue of relevance here is what it means to be a Jew. Is being Jewish 
contingent on synagogue attendance, JCC involvement, or donations to community 
Jewish organizations? Is it in lobbying on behalf of Israel or perhaps some other form 
of Israel-centrerd activity? This last question is especially pertinent as it can highlight 
the question of not only what it means to a Jew in the age of Israel, but also of who is 
a Jew. Indeed, Israeli immigration policy is closely linked to this identity question. 
Consequently, what began as a demographic question for diaspora Jews becomes a 
question relevant to political and theological debates about individual and collective 
identity that, in turn, are wielded into debates of an international nature pertaining to 
what it means to support Israel.  
 Notice how a great variety of issues come to bear on this identity-security 
issue. There is no fixed identity here. Indeed, the “who is a Jew debate” is so 
contentious in large part because it demands that identity be fixed, that religious 
identity becomes exclusively defined according to internal religious laws (although 
even here there is little agreement – for example, Orthodox Jewry in the UK will not 
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recognize some Orthodox conversions from other countries, including Israel) set by 
one Jewish community in Israel that clearly does not have authority over many Jewish 
lives. Moreover, the security issues at stake here, Israel, Jewish identity, Jewish 
communities, will have different ways of (1) framing the security issues at stake and 
(2) developing responses to these security issues.  
A strong example of these dynamics is the recent debate in the United States 
surrounding J-Street. J-Street is a political lobby group that holds at its ideological 
core a two-state solution to the conflict. J-Street has been attacked by the Israeli 
ambassador to the United States, viewing it as a “unique problem.”65 J-Street certainly 
represents a sizeable portion of American Jewry, but it has come under attack by 
some in Israel and in the United States because of a deep resistance to opening up a 
debate on the highly contentious issue of Israel’s security. In this case, the diaspora 
voice is recognized, provided that it fits into the policy agenda of the Israel 
government. My point here is not about which positions are correct in regard to 
diaspora/Israel relations. The point is that there is considerable debate and complexity 
about how security dynamics of diaspora Jewry are framed and responded to. To 
presume that there is any objective referent here is ludicrous. What exists are diverse 
groups of Jews who are in the process of asserting their sense of self in response to a 
variety of forces, including domestic political structures, internal theological debates, 
personal issues regarding religion, state and citizenship, and normative concerns over 
international affairs and violent conflict. To locate any objective referent in any of this 
that could then describe a Jewish diaspora security discourse would be false. Rather, a 
more accurate portrayal would look at the variety of security discourses and of how 
these discourses emerge from, and reaffirm, specific but contingent claims to identity.  
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Conclusion: Self and Other in Diasporic Security 
 
 Point seven of Cohen’s typology addresses how a diaspora’s existence is 
predicated on being recognized as different. Were the diaspora the main identity-
group in the country, they would not be identified as belonging to a diaspora. 
However, as points eight and nine note, diasporic identity is also contingent on 
belonging to a group that has constituencies living in other countries. Consequently, 
the difference is both a domestic and an international one. Diasporas are recognized 
because they belong to a community that is not bounded within a state and that a 
sense of solidarity remains between these communities.  
 The idea of diaspora is not about location but about community, and diasporic 
communities may exist within state boundaries, and they have to function within the 
conditions that these boundaries set up but they cannot be explained by these 
boundaries. Consequently, the security dynamics that diasporas create and are 
involved in exist in multiple planes simultaneously. Diasporas may participate in the 
national politics of liberation (like the Irish diaspora has done) or in the practices of 
sending remittances home (such as Mexicans among many other diaspora 
communities). However, these are practical responses to a world divided up into 
states. The security issues at stake cannot be explained by states but by community 
and membership. Identification with their communities in the homeland enables 
practices that are designed to reduce economic insecurities back home, or even state 
security (as is the case with Jews and Israel), but the subjective referent of security is 
membership. Membership is enabled by belonging to a specific, different, 
constituency. The practices that reinforce ties to the homeland are those that involve 
supporting this difference, and thus involve reaffirming one’s membership into 
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multiple communities. Diasporic identity is thus doubly different. Diasporas are 
others in the hostland, an otherness characterized by being a minority and having 
relations to the homeland and/or to people abroad in other hostlands, and they are 
others because they do not fit easily into the nation-state models: they do not live in 
‘their’ state, they are always foreign even when they are at home.66 A diaspora is tied 
to the place of residence, but also to communities and places abroad.  
 In this vein, the ninth common feature of a diaspora, as identified by Cohen, is 
that a diaspora is able to live a life as a member of a minority (diasporic) community 
and be recognized as such. Recognition is key. Consequently, the practices of 
solidarity that maintain ties with members who are either in other host-lands or 
possibly even in the homeland are recognized by the host countries. A diaspora needs 
to be recognized as a constituency that is not bound by state borders. How does 
security feature in this framework? First, diasporic security is based on how domestic 
and international politics are not distinct. Thus, any security risk for a member of the 
diaspora in any country poses a potential risk to all members of that diaspora. Second, 
diasporic security may either support nation-state politics or challenge existing state 
relations/boundaries. For example, diasporas may claim that their interests in 
supporting their kin abroad is actually in accordance with the national interest of the 
state where they reside. Alternatively, it may be that the interests of different state 
governments conflict with the interests of the diaspora. Diasporas may end up as 
promoters of the national interest or they might not and could contribute to 
instabilities in the homeland.
67
  
There is, in addition, another fundamental question that emerges out of using 
the diasporic example and a theoretical approach to identity based on the importance 
of difference. The question is about how security always points in at least two 
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directions. There is the security of the group, community or self, a security understood 
in self-referential terms: what are our needs, my interests, etc.? There is also the 
security of the other, but this gaze toward difference is based on the simple dynamic 
that if ‘my’ identity is based on difference, than it is in my interest to recognize that 
the security of the other is crucial to my own security. In other words, I cannot be 
secure without the other being secure.
68
 However, to argue that one’s security is 
contingent on the security of others that contribute to the construction of my identity 
is only part of the security dynamic. For, paradoxically, and as Connolly notes, there 
is the potential for evil in the other, that the necessary difference may be necessarily 
negative. In this regard there is a problem, for it means that one’s security becomes 
contingent on securing an enemy. Perhaps this is the base of what political security 
discourses are all about and why they can be so challenging. Appreciating the 
multiple identities that a diaspora experiences helps keep us aware of the complexity 
and contingencies involved in this paradox. Diasporic life is, as the Boyarin’s suggest, 
a different ground. 
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